Heidegger’s End

Abstract

So far, the question of the thesis about the end of philosophy in Heidegger’s third period of thought has remained largely unresolved. If we look at the databases of scientific articles, we can find only a few papers discussing Heidegger’s thesis on the end of philosophy. However, the question of the end is actually delivered to the gathering place of Heidegger’s entire oeuvre and its valuable self-evaluation – because the thesis on the end of philosophy actually represents a deepening, sharpening, or ultimately radicalising of Heidegger’s projects of the first and second periods of thought. Simply put: by presenting the thesis on the end of philosophy, Heidegger actually changes his initial positions, breaks away from the problems he faced for decades, insists on new propositions, and postulates the task of a new beginning. In this context, the main hypothesis of the research that follows is the possibility of determining  Heidegger’s entire oeuvre through the phenomenon of the end – suddenly, after various methodological changes, decades-long upheavals, and late redirections of intentions, the aim is to prove that all of Heidegger’s writings are directed towards the phenomenon of the end. This is intended to be proven through Heidegger’s struggle with (un)certainty, Heidegger’s presentification of the future, and Heidegger’s insistence on completion.